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The Exceptional Child's Right to an
Approved Private School Program in
Pennsylvania: Practice and Problems
I. Introduction
For Pennsylvania, the right to education plan and its implementa-
tion has been a large and difficult undertaking. . . . And with
every step forward we take, we are establishing new standards for
all states in the Union in bringing the retarded into the main-
stream of society.'
In the months immediately following the consent agreement entered
in Pennsylvania Association of Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania
(PAR C) 2 during the Milton J. Shapp administration, the governor's
words reflected the predominant, optimistic mood among propo-
nents of equal educational opportunity for the handicapped. In ret-
rospect, however, his boast was premature at best. Within two years
of the PARC decree, an evaluation of the practical impact of the case
told "an uneven tale."3 Moreover, an August 4, 1974, internal mem-
orandum of the Pennsylvania Department of Education stated that
1. Shapp, The Right to an Education for the Retarded in Pennsylvania, 23 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 1085, 1089 (1972).
2. 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (three judge panel), approved and adopted 343 F.
Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (three judge panel). PARC established the right of handicapped
children in Pennsylvania to a free, appropriate public education.
The case has a tortuous procedural history. The complaint, filed in January 1971, alleged
that certain Pennsylvania statutes violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment because their implementation denied handicapped children access to a public edu-
cation. A three judge panel heard plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction in August
after the parties had expressed a desire to settle certain due process issues out of court. On
June 18, the court approved the parties' stipulation to require a due process hearing before any
mentally retarded child could be excluded from school or assigned to any special program.
The August 12, 1971, preliminary hearing considered the equal protection issues, after
which the parties again communicated a wish to settle by agreement rather than judicial deci-
sion. On October 8, 197 1, the court approved a consent agreement and stipulation and issued
an order temporarily enjoining the defendants from applying the statutes at issue to deny the
handicapped access to an education. A December hearing aired any objections to the agree-
ments, and final arguments occurred in February 1972. An amended stipulation and amended
consent agreement were approved and adopted on May 5, 1972.
3. Kirp, Buss & Kuriloff, Legal Reform of Special Education. Empirical Studies and Pro-
cedural Proposals, 62 CAL. L. REV. 40, 81 (1974). This study concluded that a change in legal
standards does not necessarily translate into altered administrative behavior within the educa-
tional system. Id at 112-15.
One commentator recently noted that "PARC is the latest of the civil rights pebbles to be
dropped in the legal pool, and we have just begun to feel the ripples." Baugh, Federal Legisla-
tion on Equal Educational Opportunity for the Handicapped 15 IDAHO L. REV. 65, 87 (1978).
Nevertheless, as this comment suggests, the high expectations and subsequent inadequate
the Commonwealth was not keeping pace with other states in pro-
viding education for handicapped children.
4
Placement of an exceptional child in a private school is a radical
and expensive alternative to placement within the normal state edu-
cational apparatus.5 Ideally, private school placement is undertaken
only after a careful evaluation of the child's educational needs and a
concomitant appraisal of the ability of the local school district to
service those needs. In practice, this process entails a difficult bal-
ancing of state and private interests that often can only be accom-
plished in the courts.
This comment examines the exceptional child's statutory right
6
to an education in a private facility at public expense and gives par-
ticular attention to the PARC mandate of an appropriate education
for all exceptional children.7
II. The Exceptional Child's Right to an Education in
Pennsylvania: Historical Perspective
A. The PARC and Mills Decisions
The PARC and Mills v. Board of Education of the District of
Columbia8 cases represent the genesis of the exceptional child's right
to an appropriate education. Both cases concerned handicapped
children of school age who were categorized as "uneducable" and
unable to profit from an educational program.9 Plaintiffs in both ac-
Commonwealth implementation of the PARC agreement justified the early, negative apprais-
als of its impact.
4. See Frederick L. v. Thomas, 419 F. Supp. 960, 968 (E.D. Pa. 1976). The court in
Frederick L. was informed that the memorandum did not represent the official position of the
Department of Education.
5. Private school placement may quarter the child in a residential school far from home
and may also entail the child's first extended absence from familiar surroundings. A place-
ment outside regularly funded programs, moreover, burdens the Commonwealth with addi-
tional expense.
6. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 13-1372(3) (Purdon Supp. 1979-80). The term "right" may
be construed differently by lawyers and psychologists. For example, the lawyer's understand-
ing of powers, privileges, or guarantees awarded children under law may contrast with the
mental health professional's preference to speak of the "enabling rights" of a child to develop
and ultimately achieve full potential as a human being. Koocher, Child Advocacy and Mental
Health Professionals, in CHILDREN'S RIGHTS: CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES 84, 85-86 (P.
Vardin & 1. Brody ed. 1979).
7. Pennsylvania defines "exceptional children" as "children of school age who deviate
from the average in physical, mental, emotional or social characteristics to such an extent that
they require special educational facilities or services and shall include all children in detention
homes." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 13-1371(1) (Purdon Supp. 1979-80). The definition is fur-
ther refined at 22 PA. CODE §§ 13.1, 341.1. Gifted students are included in the definition of
"exceptional children." See also Central York School Dist. v. Commonwealth, Dep't of Educ.,
41 Pa. Commw. Ct. 383, 399 A.2d 167 (1979).
8. 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
9. Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 874 (D.D.C. 1972); Pennsylvania Ass'n of
Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279, 283 (E.D. Pa. 1972). Two years before
PARC and Mills, the Second Circuit determined that a state could constitutionally exclude
from its schools those children "whose handicaps prevented them from participating in
tions asserted equal protection and due process claims, alleging that
state law, without provision for notice and a hearing, denied them
access to public schools solely on the basis of handicapping condi-
tions.'o
The evidentiary basis of the final order, injunction, and consent
agreement in PARC was that "all mentally retarded persons are ca-
pable of benefitting from a program of education and training."' "
The consent agreement thus provided access for all mentally re-
tarded children to a free program of appropriate education and
training in a "regular public school class" if feasible.' 2
classes" provided that all handicapped children were denied access. McMillan v. Board of
Educ., 430 F.2d 1145, 1149 (2d Cir. 1970).
The PA4RC and Mills cases have received extensive scholarly treatment. See generally L.
LIPPMAN & I. GOLDBERG, RIGHT TO EDUCATION (1973); Alschuler, Education for the Handi-
capped, 7 J.L. & EDUC. 523 (1978); Baugh, supra note 3; Haggerty & Sacks, Education of the
Handicapped- Towards a Defnition ofan Appropriate Education, 50 TEMP. L.Q. 961 (1977);
Herr, Retarded Children and the Law.- Enforcing the Constitutional Rights of the Mentally Re-
tarded, 23 SYRACUSE L. REV. 995 (1972); Schwartz, The Education of Handicapped Children.
Emerging Legal Doctrines, 7 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 125 (1973); Comment, The Handicapped
ChildHas a Right to an Appropriate Education, 55 NEB. L. REV. 637 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
Appropriate Education]; Comment, Toward a Legal Theory of the Right to Education of the
Mentally Retarded, 34 OHIO ST. L.J. 554 (1973); Comment, Educational Equalityfor the Men-
tally Retarded, 23 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1141 (1972); Comment, The Right to Education.A Consti-
tutionalAnalysis, 44 U. CIN. L. REV. 796 (1975).
10. 348 F. Supp. at 875-76; 343 F. Supp. at 283.
i1. 343 F. Supp. at 307. The evidence consisted of the testimony of four experts in the
field of education of retarded children. Id at 285.
P4RC is among the progeny of Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), since both
cases embraced the concept of education as a process of "socialization." See Appropriate Edu-
cation, supra note 9, at 668-69. In a frequently cited passage in Brown, Chief Justice Warren
articulated this theme:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local govern-
ments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education
both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic
society. It is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities
. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument
in awakening the child to cultural values. . . and in helping him adjust normally to
his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be ex-
pected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education.
347 U.S. at 493. The P4RC court echoed this theme vis-a-vis the handicapped:
Experts agree that it is primarily the school which imposes the mentally-retarded
label and concomitant stigmatization upon children, either initially or later on
through a change in educational assignment. This follows from the fact that the
school constitutes the first social institution with which the child comes into contact.
343 F. Supp. at 295.
12. 343 F. Supp. at 307. The agreement established a "general educational policy" that
among educational program alternatives, "placement in a regular public school class is prefer-
able to placement in a special public school class" and the latter "is preferable to placement in
any other type of program of education and training." Id P4RC thus gave legal significance
to the policy and practice of "mainstreaming," defined by the Commonwealth as "an educa-
tional process of maintaining or returning exceptional persons who can best profit from such
placement, to the regular education classroom, with any needed supportive services being pro-
vided in accordance with the nature of the placement." 22 PA. CODE § 13.1. For a history of
mainstreaming and an analysis of recent criticisms of its implementation, see Note, Enforcing
the Right to an "Appropriate" Education.- The Education for All Handicapped Children Act of
1975, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1103, 1118-24 (1979).
In addition, a stipulation in PARC established due process safeguards to protect the rights
of the handicapped student. 343 F. Supp. at 303-06.
The holding in Mills mirrored the constitutional basis of the
consent agreement in PARC. The Mills court ruled that to afford a
public education to the majority of children while excluding the
handicapped was a denial of due process and equal protection.'
3
The added significance of Mills lies in the court's rejection of the
defense of insufficient financial resources. The court ordered that if
sufficient funds are unavailable to finance all needed services, ex-
penditures of existing resources must occur "equitably in such a
manner that no [handicapped] child is entirely excluded from a pub-
licly supported education. ... 4
Although PARC and Mills were resolved on equal protection
and due process grounds, the Supreme Court's decision in San
Antonio School District v. Rodriquez5 cast doubt on the viability of
equal protection arguments in right to education cases. In holding
that no fundamental right to education exists,' 6 the Rodriquez Court
apparently limited the usefulness of the equal protection tool in edu-
cation cases. 7 Rodriquez, however, only concerned relative dispari-
13. 348 F. Supp. at 874-75. The due process protections outlined went further than those
promulgated in PARC The Mills safeguards included: (1) notice to the parents of a proposed
educational placement with the reasons for such placement; (2) the right of the parents to a
hearing with representation if the proposed placement is opposed; (3) the right of the child to a
representative of his own choice, including legal counsel; (4) the right of parental access to all
documents relevant to the proposed placement; (5) the right of the parents to confront any
public school official with knowledge of the proposed action; and (6) the right of appeal to a
special committee of the Board of Education. 348 F. Supp. at 880-83. Compare Mills with
PARC, 343 F. Supp. at 303-06 and Lebanks v. Spears, 60 F.R.D. 135, 140-49 (E.D. La. 1973).
14. 348 F. Supp. at 876.
15. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). Plaintiff-appellees, public school students from districts with a low
property tax base, alleged that Texas' use of local property taxes as the method of funding
public education favored the affluent and violated equal protection. Discrimination resulted
because of significant differences in expenditures per pupil among the districts. The Court
refused to apply the strict scrutiny standard and held that the Texas system bore a rational
relationship to a legitimate state purpose. See note 17 infra.
16. 411 U.S. at 35.
.17. Resolution of the "fundamental right" question (as well as that of the "suspect class,"
discussed in note 22 and accompanying text infra) impacts on the Court's standard of review in
equal protection cases. If state action impinges on a fundamental right, or creates a suspect
class, the Court applies a strict scrutiny analysis and requires demonstration of a compelling
state interest. See, e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968). If no fundamental interest
is affected nor a suspect class created, the Court requires only that the state action bear a
rational relation to a legitimate state interest. See, e.g., San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodri-
quez, 411 U.S. 1, 18-28, 29-39 (1972). But see Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241,
96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
Sherer v. Waier, 457 F. Supp. 1039 (W.D. Mo. 1978) (rational relationship test applicable
to alleged discrimination against student with spina bifida) and Cuyahoga County Ass'n for
Retarded Children v. Essex, 411 F. Supp. 46 (N.D. Ohio 1976) (rational relationship test appli-
cable to state action excluding mentally handicapped children deemed unable to profit from
further instruction from school), both demonstrate that if education is not viewed as a funda-
mental interest and if the handicapped do not constitute a suspect class, state actions restricting
access of the handicapped to the schools will not be required to pass the demanding strict
scrutiny test. See generally McCarthy, Is the Equal Protection Clause Still a Viable Tool for
Effecting Educational Reform, 6 J.L. & EDUC. 159 (1977); Comment, Equality of Education."
Serrano v. Priest, 58 VA. L. REV. 161 (1972).
See also Kruse v. Campbell, 431 F. Supp. 180 (E.D. Va. 1977), vacated and remanded, 434
U.S. 808 (1977). The class of plaintiffs in Kruse consisted of handicapped children and their
ties in the spending levels of various school districts and not a total
deprivation of educational opportunity.' 8  Commentators' 9  and
courts,20 therefore, have agreed that the case does not preclude "a
constitutional right to a certain minimum level of education as op-
posed to a constitutional right to a particular level of education."'"
In resolving the suspect class issue, the Rodriquez Court defined
as suspect a class "saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such
a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a po-
sition of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary pro-
tection from the majoritarian political process." 22 Applying this
definition, the Court found that students from poor districts are not a
suspect class.23 The district court in Fialkowski v. Shafpp 24 found,
however, that retarded children fit the Rodriquez definition because
they are excluded from the political process and are neglected by the
state legislature.25 Although the handicapped appear to fit the Rodri-
quez suspect class criteria, the Supreme Court appears unlikely to
recognize this new suspect classification in the near future.26
Because the right of exceptional children to a free public educa-
parents who were eligible for partial tuition assistance grants for education in private programs
but who were too poor to pay that portion of the expense not covered by state aid. The district
court concluded that this tuition grant system violated the fourteenth amendment's equal pro-
tection safeguards. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded with instructions to decide the
case on the basis of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976) (amended
1978).
18. The Court implied that a different result might have occurred if the state's financing
system "occasioned an absolute denial of educational opportunities to any of its children
. 411 U.S. at 37.
19. See, e.g., J. WILSON, RIGHTS OF ADOLESCENTS IN THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM
161-62 (1978); Dimond & Reed, Rodriquez and Retarded Children, 2 J.L. & EDUC. 476 (1973);
Haggerty & Sacks, supra note 9, at 976; Lindquist & Wise, Developments in Education Litiga-
tion. Equal Protection, 5 J.L. & EDUC. 1, 5-23 (1976); Note, The Right ofHandicapped Children
to an Education: The Phoenix of Rodriquez, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 519 (1974). See also Kutner,
Keys v. School District Number One. A Constitutional Right to Equal Educational Opportunity,
8 J.L. & EDUC. 1 (1979).
20. Fialkowski v. Shapp, 405 F. Supp. 946 (E.D. Pa. 1975); In re G.H., 218 N.W.2d 441
(N.D. 1974). But see Sherer v. Waier, 457 F. Supp. 1039 (W.D. Mo. 1978); New York State
Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
21. Fialkowski v. Shapp, 405 F. Supp. 946, 958 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
22. 411 U.S. at 28. See note 15 supra.
23. 411 U.S. at 28.
24. 405 F. Supp. 946 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
25. Id at 959. This holding, however, has been widely criticized. See, e.g., Sherer v.
Waier, 457 F. Supp. 1039 (W.D. Mo. 1978); Doe v. Laconia Supervisory Union No. 30, 396 F.
Supp. 1291 (D.N.H. 1975); New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Rockefeller, 357 F.
Supp. 752 (E.D.N.Y. 1973) ; Guempel v. State, 159 N.J. Super. 166, 387 A.2d 399 (1978); Levy
v. City of New York, 38 N.Y.2d 653, 345 N.E.2d 556, 382 N.Y.S.2d 13 (1976), all of which
found no suspectness. But see, In re G.H., 218 N.W.2d 441 (N.D. 1974) (suspectness found).
Other courts have sidestepped the suspect class issue. See, e.g., New York State Ass'n for
Retarded Children v. Carey, 466 F. Supp. 487 (E.D.N.Y. 1979); Lora v. New York Bd. of
Educ., 456 F. Supp. 1211 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
26. Burgdorf & Burgdorf, A History of Unequal Treatment- The Qualifications of Handi-
capped Persons as a "Suspect Class" Under the Equal Protection Clause, 15 SANTA CLARA
LAW. 855, 910 (1975); Note, Mental Illness.- A Suspect Class#Ficationz 83 YALE L.J. 1237, 1268
(1974).
tion received its initial impetus from case law founded primarily on
the equal protection clause, the Rodriquez decision seems to qualify
these case law guarantees of equal educational opportunity for the
handicapped.27 Fortunately, however, Congress has responded to
the initial case law mandates and legislated major educational guar-
antees.
B. The Educationfor All Handicapped Children Act of 1975
The federal legislative response to PARC and Mills was the Ed-
ucation for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 (EHCA or Act).28
Passage of EHCA reflected congressional belief that the legislature
"must take a more active role under its responsibility for equal pro-
tection of the laws to guarantee that handicapped children are pro-
vided equal educational opportunity. ' 29 The immediate purpose of
the legislation was to afford financial aid to the states to provide edu-
cational services to handicapped children.3" More importantly,
EHCA sought to obviate the necessity for parents to utilize the
courts to gain equal educational opportunity for their handicapped
children.3
Funds under EHCA are conditioned on the creation of state
plans for the identification and evaluation of all handicapped chil-
dren,3 2 and each state must also establish a comprehensive program
ensuring a "free appropriate public education" to each of these chil-
dren.33 The legislation further mandates due process protections
providing for parental input into educational placement decisions.34
These protections essentially parallel those set forth in the PARC
and Mills cases.35 Basic parental rights include the right of notice
before any change in educational placement and the right to a hear-
27. See Haggerty & Sacks, supra note 9, at 993-94; Lindquist & Wise, supra note 19, at
18.
28. Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1461 (Cum. Supp.
1978)); 45 C.F.R. §§ 12 Ia. 1-754 (1978). See generally Stafford, Educationfor the Handicapped."
A Senator's Perspective, 3 VT. L. REV. 71 (1978); Note, supra note 12.
29. S. REP. No. 94-168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 9, reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 1425, 1433.
30. Id at 7-9, U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 1431-33.
31. Id at 9, U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 1433.
32. The term "handicapped children" is defined at 20 U.S.C. § 1401(l) (Cum. Supp.
1978).
33. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(2)(A),(C) (Cum. Supp.1978). The Act provided the states with a
timetable, necessitating each state desiring funds to submit a plan demonstrating that "a free
appropriate public education" would be available by September 1, 1978, for all handicapped
children between the ages of three and eighteen within the state. A state's eligibility is further
conditioned upon extension of these services to twenty-one year olds by September 1, 1980. 20
U.S.C. § 1412(B) (Cum. Supp. 1978). See, e.g., PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
FISCAL YEAR 1980 ANNUAL PROGRAM PLAN UNDER PART B OF THE EDUCATION OF THE
HANDICAPPED ACT As AMENDED BY PUBLIC LAW 94-142 (1979).
34. 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (Cum. Supp. 1978); 45 C.F.R. §§ 121a.500-.593 (1978).
35. See note 13 supra.
ing to contest the proposed placement.36 The outcome of the due
process hearing is appealable to the state agency responsible for edu-
cation and then to any state court of competent jurisdiction or fed-
eral district court.3 7
EHCA provides few guidelines defining "appropriate" educa-
tion for the handicapped. 3' The only specific provision on appro-
priateness calls for an "individualized education program" (IEP), a
written statement of such matters as educational goals, services, and
scheduled evaluations prepared for each child.39 On a broad policy
level, EHCA requires that the state procedures ensure that handi-
capped children are educated with the nonhandicapped "to the max-
imum extent appropriate."'
Although EHCA is still in the early stages of its effective life, it
has already evolved into the major vehicle for enforcement of the
handicapped child's rights." Litigation has predictably centered
around disputes between parents and school authorities over what
36. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1)(c), (2) (Cum. Supp. 1978); 45 C.F.R. §§ 121a.504-.506 (1978).
Any party to a hearing has the right, inter alia, to: (1) obtain legal and expert (educational)
counsel; (2) present evidence and confront and cross examine witnesses; (3) prohibit the intro-
duction of evidence that has not been disclosed to the party at least five days prior to the
hearing; (4) obtain a verbatim record of the hearing; and (5) obtain written findings of fact.
Parties who are parents have a right to a public hearing. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(d) (Cum. Supp.
1978); 45 C.F.R. § 121a.508 (1978).
The due process procedures under EHCA apply only to financial aid received after Octo-
ber 1, 1977, and are not retroactive. See Stemple v. Board of Educ., 464 F. Supp. 258 (D. Md.
1979); Eberle v. Board of Pub. Educ., 444 F. Supp. 41 (W.D. Pa. 1977), a'd 582 F.2d 1274 (3d
Cir. 1978).
37. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(c), (e)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1978); 45 C.F.R. §§ 121a.509-.511 (1978).
38. The term "free appropriate public education" is defined at 20 U.S.C. § 1401(18)
(1978). As the definition indicates, the specifics concerning what constitutes "appropriateness"
are left to the states.
39. An individualized education program is defined as
a written statement for each handicapped child developed in any meeting by a repre-
sentative of the local educational agency . . . who shall be qualified to provide, or
supervise the provision of, specially designed instruction to meet the unique needs of
handicapped children, the teacher, the parents or guardian of such child. . . which
statement shall include (A) a statement of the present levels of educational perform-
ance of such child, (B) a statement of annual goals, including short-term instructional
objectives, (C) a statement of the specific educational services to be provided to such
child, and the extent to which such child will be able to participate in regular educa-
tional programs, (D) the projected date for initiation and anticipated duration of such
services and (E) appropriate objective criteria and evaluation procedures and sched-
ules for determining, on at least an annual basis, whether instructional objectives are
being achieved.
20 U.S.C. § 1401(19) (Cum. Supp. 1978).
40. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5) (Cum. Supp. 1978). The provision mandates mainstreaming, or
education in the "least restrictive environment," another legacy from P/ARC. See note 12
supra. See also Connors & Connors, Children's Rights and Mainstreaming of the Handicapped
in CHILDREN's RIGHTS: CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES 67, 74-75 (P. Vardin & I. Brody ed.
1979); Miller & Miller, The Handicapped Child's Civil Right as it Relates to the "Least Restric-
live Environment" and Appropriate Mainstreaming, 54 IND. L.J. 1 (1978); Stafford, supra note
28, at 76.
41. Actions to enforce rights of the handicapped to an education have also been brought
under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976) (amended 1978). See, e.g., New
Mexico Ass'n for Retarded Citizens v. New Mexico, No. Civil 75- 633M (D.N.M., filed 1979);
Boxall v. Sequoia Union High School Dist., 464 F. Supp. 1104 (N.D. Cal. 1979); Doe v. Mar-
constitutes an "appropriate" educational placement.4 2 Thus, con-
gressional expectations that EHCA would obviate the need for judi-
cial involvement have not been achieved.
III. The Exceptional Child's Placement in an Approved Private
School: Pennsylvania Procedure
The final order issuing from PARC enjoined the Common-
wealth from applying various statutory provisions of the Public
School Code of 194943 to postpone or deny exceptional children ac-
cess to a free public education.' Pursuant to the PARC consent
agreement, the Commonwealth assumed the task of identifying and
evaluating all handicapped children45 and, thereby, the affirmative
duty of providing a free public education to all exceptional chil-
dren.46
In the wake of PARC, an increased number of exceptional chil-
dren were expected to seek educational services. Consequently, con-
sideration immediately turned to "existing private facilities and
resources in the private school sector" as valuable ancillary sources
of educational programs. 47 Currently, detailed Pennsylvania proce-
dures exist for placement of an exceptional child in an approved pri-
vate school 48 at public expense.
shall, 459 F. Supp. 1190 (S.D. Texas 1978); Sherer v. Waier, 457 F. Supp. 1039 (W.D. Mo.
1978); Hairston v. Drosick, 423 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.W. Va. 1976).
Actions have also been brought under the civil rights statute at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Cum.
Supp.1978). See, e.g., Reid v. Board of Educ., 453 F.2d 238 (2d Cir. 1971); Brown v. Kline,
No. 78-2814 (E.D. Pa., filed Sept. 19, 1978); Fialkowski v. Shapp, 405 F. Supp. 946 (E.D. Pa.
1975).
42. See, e.g., Pecunas v. Kline, No. 78-3133 (E.D. Pa., filed Sept. 19, 1978) placement of
physically handicapped boy of normal intelligence in regular classroom contested by school
district); Harris v. Campbell, 472 F. Supp. 51 (E.D. Va. 1979) (action by mother after "exten-
sive efforts" by school district to find appropriate placement for emotionally disturbed child
failed); North v. District of Columbia Bd. of Educ., 471 F. Supp. 136 (D.D.C. 1979) (suit
brought after education and welfare agencies each disclaimed responsibility for placement of
multiple-handicapped boy); Loughran v. Flanders, 470 F. Supp. 110 (D. Conn. 1979) (suit
brought after alleged failure of school district to diagnose and take steps to remedy condition
of a learning disabled child); Boxall v. Sequoia Union High School Dist., 464 F. Supp. 1104
(N.D. Cal. 1979) (suit brought after austistic child denied full-time tutor in his home by school
district); Stemple v. Board of Educ., 464 F. Supp. 258 (D. Md. 1979) (placement of handi-
capped child in private school held premature for bringing action under EHCA for tuition
reimbursement). See also Note, supra note 12, at 1125.
43. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 13-1304; 13-1318; 13-1326; 13-1330(2); 13-1371(1); 13-
1372(3); 13-1375; 13-1376 (Purdon 1962).
44. Pennsylvania Ass'n of Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279, 302
(E.D. Pa. 1972); 22 PA. CODE § 13.62. See PA. ATr'Y GEN. Op. No. 74 (1971).
45. 343 F. Supp. at 315.
46. The duty arising from PARC was later complemented by the provisions of EHCA, 20
U.S.C. §§ 1401-1461 (1978). See notes 28-42 and accompanying text supra.
47. PA. AT-r'y GEN. Op. No. 137 (1972) (emphasis added). EHCA also recognizes pri-
vate schools as possible resources. See 20 U.S.C. § 1413(a)(4) (1978).
48. An "approved private school" is defined as a
private school licensed by the State Board of Private Academic Schools when the
specific special education program for certain exceptional handicapped persons is
approved by the Secretary and is thereby eligible to receive payments for tuition, or
A. Identification, Evaluation, and Placement of the Child
Local school district officials are primarily responsible for locat-
ing and identifying all exceptional children within their districts.
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All approved private schools are required to assist in the identifica-
tion process by referring children "thought to be handicapped" to
the school district of residence.5" Each district school superintendent
must refer every exceptional child in his district to the proper inter-
mediate unit (IO)5 prior to October 15 of each year.52
Local school districts also have the primary duty of providing
an "appropriate" educational program for each exceptional child,
53
but if the district is unable to provide an effective, suitable program,
the services of the intermediate unit are used.54 When neither the
district nor the intermediate unit is able to satisfactorily provide for
the child, the district must consider suitable approved private schools
as a placement alternative.55
Before an exceptional child is assigned to or denied any special
education program, including placement in an approved private
school, the district must conduct an evaluation of the child.56 Evalu-
tuition and maintenance, from funds of the school district or the Commonwealth, or
both.
22 PA. CODE § 171.11. Private schools must apply for "approved" status. Id § 171.23.
The Department of Education approves additional private school programs when it ap-
pears that these programs cannot be provided by an agency of the Commonwealth. Id
§ 171.12(b). The Department, however, does not have an affirmative duty to act upon applica-
tions for "approved" status. Summit School, Inc. v. Commonwealth, Dep't of Educ., 43 Pa.
Commw. Ct. 623, 402 A.2d 1142 (1979).
A complete list of approved piivate schools is published annually by the Department of
Education pursuant to 22 PA. CODE § 171.12(c). Schools are listed therein according to the
special programs they offer for handling specific handicapping conditions. See PENN-
SYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, APPROVED PRIVATE SCHOOL LISTINGS (1978).
49. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 13-1371(2) (Purdon Supp. 1979-80); 22 PA. CODE § 341.12.
Districts are required to indicate in policy statements those "group screening instruments"
used to identify exceptional children. The instruments include standard achievement tests,
speech and language tests, and visual and hearing examinations administered in accordance
with PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 14-1401-14-1422 (Purdon 1962). 22 PA. CODE § 341.12(c).
50. 22 PA. CODE § 171.14.
51. The term "intermediate unit" is defined by federal statute as "any public authority,
other than a local educational agency, which is under the general supervision of a State educa-
tional agency, which is established. . . for the purpose of providing free public education on a
regional basis, and which provides special education and related services to handicapped chil-
dren within that State." 20 U.S.C. § 1401(22) (1978). Pennsylvania's twenty-nine intermediate
units have the duty to provide, administer, and maintain "such additional classes or schools as
are necessary or to otherwise provide for the proper education and training for all exceptional
children who are not enrolled in classes or schools maintained and operated by school districts
.... " PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 13-1372(4) (Purdon Supp. 1979-80).
52. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 13-1371(2) (Purdon Supp. 1979-80).
53. Id § 13-1372(3); 22 PA. CODE § 171.13. See West Chester Area School Dist. v. Com-
monwealth, Secretary of Educ., 43 Pa. Commw. Ct. 14, 401 A.2d 600 (1979).
54. 22 PA. CODE § 171.13.
55. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 13-1372(3) (Purdon Supp. 1979-80); 22 PA. CODE
§§ 171.12(a); 171.13. See also Summit School, Inc. v. Commonwealth, Dep't of Educ., 43 Pa.
Commw. Ct. 623, 628, 402 A.2d 1142, 1145 (1979); PA. ATT'Y GEN. Op. No. 137 (1972).
56. 22 PA. CODE §§ 171.15(a); 341.13(a).
ations consist chiefly of comprehensive psycho-educational testing,57
which parents may request without charge by the school district or
which they may elect to purchase from other sources. 8 In the event
an outside evaluation is obtained, the school district may conduct
supplementary tests before recommending an appropriate pro-
gram.59
A school district may conclude that an approved private school
assignment is warranted.6 ° An IEP conference must, however, pre-
cede any assignment or change in educational placement in order to
formulate educational goals and timetables for the exceptional child,
to determine specific services to be provided, and to allow for paren-
tal participation as to the disposition of the child.6 The product of
the conference is a written IEP.62
When the school district recommends a private school place-
ment, the district superintendent must certify to the Department of
Education that a "priority order of educational placement" has been
followed.6 3 A student cannot be assigned to an approved private
school if his educational needs can be satisfied through placement in
a higher tier.
57. Id §§ 171.15(d); 341.13(c),(d).
58. Id §§ 171.15(b),(c). Evaluations can be quite expensive. See Note, supra note 12, at
1112 n.59. Massachusetts and New York afford parents the right to an outside independent
evaluation at public expense. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 71B, § 3 (West Supp. 1979); 8
N.Y.C.R.R. § 200.5(b)(2) (1978) (regulations promulgated by New York's Commissioner of
Education). See also Comment, Educating New York's Handicapped Children, 43 ALB. L. REV.
95, 112 (1978).
59. 22 PA. CODE § 171.15(c).
60. Id § 171.16(b). The reviewers must conclude that neither the district nor the IU is
able to provide an appropriate education program before recommending private school place-
ment. See Savka v. Commonwealth, Dep't of Educ., 44 Pa. Commw. Ct. 62, 403 A.2d 142
(1979); West Chester Area School Dist. v. Commonwealth, Secretary of Educ., 43 Pa. Commw.
Ct. 14, 401 A.2d 610 (1979).
61. 22 PA. CODE §§ 341.15-. 16. Conference participants include a representative of the
school district or IU, a teacher or potential teacher of the exceptional child, the child's parents,
and the child if his presence is appropriate. Id § 341.16(a). At a minimum, an annual review
of the child's education program is required. Id § 341.17. See Eberle v. Board of Pub. Educ.,
444 F. Supp. 41, 44 (W.D. Pa. 1977); Savka v. Commonwealth, Dep't of Educ., 44 Pa.
Commw. Ct. 62, 68, 403 A.2d 142, 145 (1979).
62. See note 39 and accompanying text supra.
63. 22 PA. CODE § 171.16(c). The "priority order of placement" is essentially a procedu-
ral device designed to implement mainstreaming, and the various priority stages represent the
range of possible educational placements in descending order of "desirability." West Chester
Area School Dist. v. Commonwealth, Secretary of Educ., 43 Pa. Commw. Ct. 14, 18, 401 A.2d
610, 612 (1979).
The priority tiers are as follows: (1) placement in a regular class in a regular school; (2)
placement in a school district special education program in a regular school; (3) placement in a
district special education program in a special facility; (4) placement in an intermediate pro-
gram in a regular school; (5) placement in an intermediate program in a special facility; and (6)
placement in an approved private school program. 22 PA. CODE § 171.16(c).
The "priority order of placement" scheme is also known as the "Cascade System." The
largest number of children are placed in the first level, the regular school classroom. Progress-
ing down the order, gradually smaller numbers of exceptional children requiring greater serv-
ices are relegated to each tier. Weintraub & Abeson, Appropriate Education for All
Handicapped Children" A Growing Issue, 23 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1037, 1039-41 (1972).
When assignment to an approved private school is recom-
mended, the school district notifies the parents and forwards an ap-
plication for placement to the Department of Education for
approval.' The Department must approve or disallow the applica-
tion within fifteen days of receipt. If the Department fails to act
within the prescribed period, the application is regarded as ap-
proved.65
B. Financial Provisions
When an exceptional child is enrolled in an approved private
school with Department of Education approbation, the school dis-
trict assumes twenty-five percent of the allowable costs, and the
Commonwealth furnishes the balance. Qualifications, however, ex-
ist to this apparently simple funding arrangement.66
"Tuition and maintenance" are the only allowable costs under
existing state law.6 7 Until recently, state funds were only available to
cover a 180-day school year.68  Moreover, ceilings are imposed on
state payments of the costs of tuition and maintenance.69 Parents
64. 22 PA. CODE § 171.16(e).
65. 1d § 171.16(g)(l). The Department may disapprove an assignment even if the par-
ents and school district agree on its propriety. Id § 171.16(g)(2). The Department will ap-
prove an application for a private school placement only if: (1) the priority order of placement
requirement has been satisfied; (2) the requirement of mainstreaming has been met; (3) a
change in the child's prior placement is justified; (4) the child's primary handicap has been
correctly categorized; and (5) the program of the private school is appropriate for the child.
Brief for Appellee [Department of Education] at 12, Levy v. Commonwealth, Dep't of Educ.,
41 Pa. Commw. Ct. 356, 399 A.2d 159 (1979).
66. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 13-1376(a) (Purdon Supp. 1979-80). Only those exceptional
children with certain handicapping conditions are eligible for approved private school place-
ment at public expense. The "approved" handicaps are blindness or deafness, cerebral palsy,
brain damage, muscular dystrophy, mental retardation, and social and emotional disturbances.
Id. Thus, certain classes of children defined as "exceptional" under 22 PA. CODE §§ 13.1, 341.1
are denied right of access to approved private schools. These classes consist of the learning
disabled and the gifted. The denial of the right to learning disabled children may be a viola-
tion of federal law under provisions of EHCA. See EDUCATION LAW CENTER, INC., RIGHT TO
SPECIAL EDUCATION IN PENNSYLVANIA 9, n.6 (1979).
67. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 13-1376(a) (Purdon Supp. 1979-80). The Commonwealth
defines "maintenance" as "board, lodging, supervision, and other activities that are reasonably
necessary to sustain the physical well-being of the child while in residence." 22 PA. CODE
§ 171.11.
The phrase "tuition and maintenance" is, at best, an inadequate description of the type of
care required by the special needs of exceptional children. Cf. In re G.H., 218 N.W.2d 441,
445 (N.D. 1974) (in which the Supreme Court of North Dakota considered the terms "subsis-
tence and tuition").
68. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 13-1376(a) (Purdon Supp. 1979-80). "School year" is de-
fined at 22 PA. CODE § 171.11. In Armstrong v. Kline, 476 F. Supp. 583 (E.D. Pa. 1979), the
plaintiffs successfully challenged the 180-day funding limit.
69. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 13-1376(a) (Purdon Supp. 1979-80). For example, an $8,500
yearly ceiling on tuition and maintenance funds exists for eligible exceptional children en-
rolled in residential programs at approved private schools, with lesser amounts approved for
students enrolled in private day schools. Id Ceiling increases are authorized for multihandi-
capped children. Id § 13-1376(f).
In Halderman v. Pittenger, 391 F. Supp. 872 (E.D. Pa. 1975), allegedly exceptional chil-
dren challenged the funding ceilings as a denial of equal protection. The court found the
may purchase additional "optional services" provided by private
schools to supplement their child's education.70
C Due Process Protections
The parents' right to notice vests automatically when the school
district decides to alter the educational status of the exceptional
child.v  Notice to the parents is required whenever the district elects
to take any of the following actions: an initial evaluation or subse-
quent reevaluation; a change in the classification of the handicap-
ping condition; 2 a revision of the IEP; or a change in educational
placement. When notified of a proposed change in the educational
status of his child, a parent may initiate due process procedures if he
disagrees with the contemplated change.13 The parent's initial step is
to request the convening of a "program placement conference," the
goal of which is an amicable agreement between the parties on the
contested assignment.74
The parent may subsequently request a due process hearing if
the conference fails to resolve the disagreement.7 5 At the hearing,
chaired by an appointee of the Secretary of Education, the parent
has the right to present evidence and testimony contesting the pro-
posed change in educational status,76 and any change "shall be ap-
proved only if supported by substantial evidence on the whole record
of the hearing. '7 7 The hearing officer forwards his findings and rec-
ommendations to the Secretary of Education for final disposition.
78
The Secretary's decision may be appealed to Commonwealth
plaintiffs' claims "sufficiently substantial" to require the convening of a three-judge panel pur-
suant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281, 2284. Id
70. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 13-1376(d) (Purdon Supp. 1979-80); 22 PA. CODE
§ 17 1.16(0. "Payments for optional services" are defined as "charges for programs and serv-
ices offered directly to parents which are not part of the program of instruction and mainte-
nance appropriate to the needs of the child or not part of the normal school year." Id
§ 171.11. See O'Grady v. Centennial School Dist., 43 Pa. Commw. Ct. 287, 294, 401 A.2d
1388, 1391 (1979).
71. 22 PA. CODE § 13.32(1), (2).
72. The particular handicap classification given to the exceptional child bears directly on
the right to placement in an approved private school. See Levy v. Commonwealth, Dep't of
Educ., 41 Pa. Commw. Ct. 356, 399 A.2d 159 (1979). See note 66 supra.
73. 22 PA. CODE § 13.33.
74. Id § 13.32(8). In preparing for the conference, the parent has the right to request a
complete evaluation of his child and to receive all documents and tests relating to the proposed
change. Id § 13.32(4), (5).
75. Id § 13.32(9).
76. The conduct of the hearing and the rights of the parties are set forth at id § 13.32(9)-
(23).
77. Id § 13.32(15). The hearing officer is not the ultimate factfinder, but functions as the
"designee of the agency head, charged with the responsibility to conduct a hearing, hear evi-
dence, make findings, and submit a proposed report to the agency head... " Fitz v. Interme-
diate Unit # 29, 43 Pa. Commw. Ct. 370, 376, 403 A.2d 138, 141 (1979) (emphasis in the
original).
78. 1 PA. CODE § 35.187; 22 PA. CODE § 1.6.
Court
7 9 or to federal district court.8"
IV. Problems Inherent in "Interest Balancing"
A cursory analysis of the preceding statutory scheme suggests
that an efficient mechanism exists for the realization of educational
opportunity for the handicapped child. Unfortunately, the realities
of statute implementation rarely conform to that mechanical effi-
ciency envisioned by legislative drafters. Rarer still is achievement
of the moral or ethical element aspired to by proponents of rights for
the handicapped.8
The implementation of laws designed to secure educational op-
portunities for exceptional children entails a complex process of
compromise or "interest balancing."82 The educational placement
decision affects the vital interests of the child and his parents, the
parents of "normal" children, and the education bureaucracy.83
These disparate interests often clash, and special attention must
be directed to the apparent failure of the law to delineate the precise
rights and responsibilities of the private and public entities con-
cerned.84 This shortcoming is highlighted when combined with the
realization that the state is increasingly intruding into education, an
area reserved traditionally to parents. 85 The current situation is typi-
79. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 763(a) (Purdon 1979-80).
80. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1978).
81. Existing laws relating to the handicapped may "embody gross overreaction":
Essentially, we are witnessing a tendency for society to project its own anxieties on a
symbolic group--the fears of lack of impulse control and the fears of helplessness,
dependency, and vulnerability. Many of our own existential conflicts are projected,
by a rather primitive psychological mechanism, onto this entire [handicapped] popu-
lation.
Roos, Basic Personal and Civil Rights, in THE MENTALLY RETARDED CITIZEN AND THE LAW
26, 27 (M. Kindred, J. Cohen, D. Penrod, T. Shaffer ed. 1976).
82. See Kirp, Schools as Sorters- The Constitutional and Policy Implications of Student
Classication, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 705, 780-85 (1973).
83. Difficulties arise when one attempts tojustify the common assumption that the inter-
ests of the parents and their child are identical. Modem understanding of the intense psycho-
logical pressures attending the interrelationship of a family with an exceptional child may
necessitate a challenge to the traditional notion that parents always act in the best interests of
their children. See id; Murdock, Civil Rights of the Mentally Retarded" Some Critical Issues,
48 NOTRE DAME LAW. 133, 143 (1972).
Many people with "normal" children see special education as competing with the needs of
their offspring and argue that resources are better spent on those students who manifest visible
and substantial progress in school. Exceptional children often do not display rapid educa-
tional gains in the conventional sense. As one unnamed legislator put it, "one cannot spend
thousands of dollars to teach a child to brush his teeth." Benjamin & Blair, Implementation of
Education Laws Relating to Exceptional Children: The Maine Experience, 11 CLEARINGHOUSE
REV. 449, 455 (1977). School administrations also generally resist added expenditures for the
introduction of new programs of instruction for special children. Kirp, supra note 82, at 780-
85.
84. See generally Comment, supra note 58.
85. That the "nurture and upbringing" of children is primarily a parental responsibility
has been a tenet consistently affirmed by the Supreme Court in education cases. See, e.g.,
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535
(1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
fled by a recent brief prepared for a school district. After noting a
mother's "well-intentioned, but frenetic and peripatetic applications
to, and assaults upon, various [state] agencies" on behalf of her
multihandicapped son, the solicitor concluded, "Without power in
the parents to obstruct the process, there should be little or no prob-
lem."86
A. Inaction and Delay. Methods and Practices of Excluding
Exceptional Children from School
Throughout his school career, seventeen-year-old Joseph
Brown87 was regularly evaluated by school district personnel, who
noted signs of severe emotional disturbance. Although placement in
a residential facility was recommended by the school psychologist in
1975, Joseph remained in a class for the mentally retarded at a regu-
lar high school and received no special educational services for his
problem. During the 1976-77 school year, Joseph's mother received
frequent complaints from school authorities concerning the boy's ab-
errant behavior, and in June 1977 school officials "advised" Mrs.
Brown to remove her son from school. Joseph remained out of
school through the fall semester of 1977 while his mother futilely
sought another educational placement from the district. An IEP
conference,88 finally convened in April, 1978, resulted in a unani-
mous recommendation to place Joseph in a suitable private school.
As of August 1978, however, Joseph remained excluded from any
educational placement.
The plight of Joseph Brown is, unfortunately, not unique.89
Handicapped children are routinely denied access to a beneficial ed-
ucation because of a variety of circumstances. "Disruptive" children
may be suspended outright.90 Parents may be "advised" to remove
86. Brief for Respondent [school district] at 1, 10, O'Grady v. Centennial School Dist., 43
Pa. Commw. Ct. 287, 401 A.2d 1388 (1979). To its credit, the Department of Education ex-
pressly refused to join in the ad hominem attacks of the school district against the mother.
Brief for Respondent [Department] at 3, id.
87. The case history of Joseph Brown is reconstructed from factual allegations and ex-
hibits contained in Complaint, Brown v. Kline, No. 78-2814 (E.D. Pa., filed August 23, 1978).
88. See notes 61-62 and accompanying text supra.
89. Minority groups in urban areas are particularly subject to this predicament. Re-
search conducted by the Education Law Center, Inc., a public interest legal organization, dis-
closed that as of November 1977, 360 Hispanic school children in need of special education in
the School District of Philadelphia were not receiving the needed services. Complaint at 16,
Jesus Ivan M., No. - (H.E.W., filed July 26, 1978). See also Lora v. Board of Educ., 456 F.
Supp. 1211 (E.D.N.Y. 1978); Schwartz, supra note 9, at 125.
90. See, e.g., Complaint, Jesus Ivan M., No. - (H.E.W., filed July 26, 1978). Jesus Ivan, a
five-year-old Hispanic child thought to be handicapped, was sent home from a Philadelphia
public school kindergarten two weeks into the 1977 fall semester. The following letter was sent
to Jesus' mother from a school official:
Please do not send Jesus Ivan, your son, to Afternoon Kindergarten any more until
you get notice from [the] School.
Jesus is very disruptive, behavior bad [sic] [and] teachers cannot put up with his
their children from school,9 and evaluations, which are so crucial to
an appropriate placement, may be ignored or never conducted.
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The formulation of IEPs may often be delayed93 or completely ne-
glected.94 Examination of the cases suggests that inaction and delay
on the part of education officials result from bureaucratic lethargy,
custom, and blind adherence to statutory dictates.95 In Brown v.
Kline,9 6 for example, the plaintiffs alternatively alleged that failures
and refusals to act on the part of district and Department of Educa-
tion personnel constituted either official policy or widespread and
persistent custom and usage.97
The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania has recently sanc-
tioned official delays in educational placement. In Savka v. Com-
monwealth, Department of Education,98 the court held that the
Department of Education had authority to delay to the following
school year the effective date of a child's transfer to an intermediate
unit program when a determination of the appropriateness of the
program was not made until November.99 This holding has unfortu-
nate implications beyond the educational costs to the child occa-
actions. He spits on teachers [and] students. Kicks [sic] teachers-fights students
calls bad names [sic] in Spanish land] English.
We cannot have him in [school] at this time. Keep Jesus home until [the school]
notifies you what they have worked out for him.
Id (Exhibit A). The mother's repeated attempts to have her son returned to school were
rebuffed, and when the boy was finally evaluated in January of 1978 Mrs. M. received no
diagnosis or copies of evaluations. As of July 1978, Jesus Ivan was without an educational
assignment. Id at 5-6.
91. See, e.g., note 87 and accompanying text supra.
92. See, e.g., the cases of Jorge Mario R., Jorge Luis R., Miguel P., Carisa I.R., and
Hiram S. in Complaint at 7-15, Jesus Ivan M., No. - (H.E.W., filed July 26, 1978). Hiram S.
was identified as a potentially handicapped child by his kindergarten teacher in May 1977.
One year later, after legal intervention on his behalf, Hiram S. was finally scheduled for evalu-
ation. The evaluating psychologist failed to keep the appointment, and as of July 1978 Hiram
remained unevaluated. Id at 14-15.
93. See, e.g., the cases of Carisa I.R. and Sol. R. in id. at 11-14.
94. See, e.g., Stubbs v. Kline, 463 F. Supp. 110, 113 (W.D. Pa. 1978); the case of Miguel
P. in Complaint at 9-10, Jesus Ivan M., No. - (H.E.W., filed July 26, 1978).
The Commonwealth solicited public comments on its 1980 education program plan sub-
mitted to the Department of Health, Education and Welfare as a condition for receiving funds
under EHCA. See notes 32-33 and accompanying text supra. Various commentators, includ-
ing parents and educators, noted a lack of adequate screening of children at the elementary
level and expressed reservations on the quality of IEPs. "It was indicated that parents will
have to be more informed, aggressive, and willing to spend a great deal of time and effort
when seeking appropriate programs and services for their handicapped children." See PENN-
SYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, FISCAL YEAR 1980 ANNUAL PROGRAM PLAN UNDER
PART B OF THE EDUCATION OF THE HANDICAPPED ACT AS AMENDED BY PUBLIC LAW 94-142
app. E at 186-87 (1979).
95. See Bates, The Right to an Appropriate Free Public Education, in THE MENTALLY
RETARDED CITIZEN AND THE LAW 267, 268 (M. Kindred, J. Cohen, D. Penrod, T. Shaffer ed.
1976).
96. No. 78-2814 (E.D. Pa., filed August 23, 1978).
97. Complaint at 14, id Plaintiffs alleged that district officials were instructed by the
Department of Education "not to recommend any child for a residential special education
program regardless of that child's need for such a program." Id at 13.
98. 44 Pa. Commw. Ct. 62, 403 A.2d 142 (1979).
99. Id at 67, 403 A.2d at 145.
sioned by the delay. Parents may feel compelled to seek placement
through other, less conventional channels. In O'Grady v. Centennial
School District, "o the parents of an exceptional child were forced to
resort to a dependency adjudication'' in an attempt to circumvent
the delay in their son's education caused by their placement dispute
with the school district.
0 2
That exceptional children are denied an effective education
through the use of a variety of "subtle" delaying tactics, including
drug injections, is widely recognized. 0 3 Pennsylvania cases demon-
strate that dilatory tactics may include postponement, suspension, or
inclusion in an inappropriate program.1°4 Program transfers and the
placement of handicapped students on waiting lists for needed serv-
ices are other manifestations of delay.'0 5 Prolonged litigation at-
tempting to force officials to act may, however, only serve to
exacerbate the problem.
100. 43 Pa. Commw. Ct. 287, 401 A.2d 1388 (1979).
101. Under 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 6301-6363 (Purdon 1979-80), legal custody of a
child judged dependent (ie., "without proper parental care or control, subsistence, education
as required by law, or other care or control necessary for his physical, mental, or emotional
health, or morals," may be granted to a state agency or private organization licensed to care
for the child. In O'Grady, the parents' petition to Juvenile Court to have their son declared
dependent was an attempt to secure his placement in an approved private school (as custodian)
for brain damaged children. See Brief for Petitioners at 6, O'Grady v. Centennial School
Dist., 43 Pa. Commw. Ct. 287, 401 A.2d 1388 (1979). The Department of Education asserted
that a dependency adjudication effectively rendered moot a parent-initiated dispute then pend-
ing before it because custody of the child was in a third party. Brief for Respondent [Depart-
ment of Education] at 6, id. The school district accordingly argued that it was not responsible
for the minor-plaintiffs education because his legal custodian (a private school) was not lo-
cated within its boundaries. Brief for Respondent [school district] at 9, id The commonwealth
court saw no merit in either argument and refused to allow the respondents to avoid their
responsibilities. 43 Pa. Commw. Ct. at 294, 401 A.2d at 1391.
The use of dependency adjudications to secure educational placements for handicapped
children is not uncommon. See, e.g., North v. District of Columbia Bd. of Educ., 471 F. Supp.
136 (D.D.C. 1979); Kruse v. Campbell, 431 F. Supp. 180 (E.D. Va. 1977), vacated and re-
manded, 434 U.S. 808 (1977).
102. O'Grady v. Centennial School Dist., 43 Pa. Commw. Ct. 287, 401 A.2d 1388 (1979).
103. See Handel, The Role of the Advocate in Securing the Handicapped Child's Right to an
Effective Minimal Education, 36 OHIO ST. L.J. 349, 351 (1975); Jackson, The Coerced Use of
Ritalinfor Behavior Control in Public Schools: Legal Challenges, 10 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 181
(1976); Weintraub & Abeson, supra note 63, at 1044.
104. Dilatory tactics, moreover, are not peculiar to Pennsylvania. See, e.g., Reid v. Board
of Educ., 453 F.2d 238 (2d Cir. 1971); Harris v. Campbell, 472 F. Supp. 51 (E.D. Va. 1979);
North v. District of Columbia Bd. of Educ., 471 F. Supp. 136 (D.D.C. 1979); Pitts v. Board of
Educ., 568 S.W.2d 595 (Mo. 1978).
In Pitts, for example, the court was forced to moot plaintiff's claims after four years of
dispute because another round of remand evaluations and judicial review could not be com-
pleted before the boy was graduated, albeit with an inappropriate education, and rendered
ineligible for special education programs. Id at 596-97. The court determined that the school
board made an error of law in refusing to assign the boy to a special education program.
Nevertheless, the plaintiffs petition was "made moot ... by the inability of the judicial proc-
ess to render a judgment of any practical effect." The court was "disconcerted that this process
of determinations has been so laggardly for so cogent a statutory purpose." Id at 596.
105. See, e.g, Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 869-70 (D.D.C. 1972). In Mills,
handicapped children were placed on waiting lists for tuition grants and thus were effectively
barred from any publicly supported educational program. Id See also Handel, supra note
103.
B. Avoidance of Responsibility
Terrence Stubbs"°6 began attending the Highland School, an
approved private day school for socially and emotionally disturbed
children, in November 1976. In August of 1977 the boy was unlaw-
fully excluded from Highland in violation of established due process
protections.1 7 One month later Terrence's school district recom-
mended his placement in another approved private facility, the
Home for Crippled Children, and Terrence's mother approved the
recommendation. From September 1977 through April 1978, the
school district psychologist futilely sought interim placement for
Terrence through the local IU. Neither the IU nor the Home en-
deavored to formulate the required IEP for Terrence.
During the winter of 1977-78, Terrence's mother requested and
received a due process hearing on the continuing denial of educa-
tional services to her son. The hearing officer's decision of February
1978 called for placement of the boy in the Home as soon as possi-
ble, an interim placement, and the formulation of an IEP. In March
the Department of Education received and approved the application
for Terrence's placement in the Home. The mother filed suit in fed-
eral court and alleged that various violations of federal and state
law' 018 had culminated in denial of Terrence's education for the year
1977-78.
Judge Ziegler stated the obvious in the court's opinion in Stubbs
v. Kline'0 9 when he noted that "the crux of this dispute concerns the
nature and scope of the duties which apply to Terrence Stubbs.""
The facts of Stubbs demonstrate a multi-tiered official avoidance of
statutory responsibility.ll' Avoidance of duty is an element of inac-
tion and delay and is, albeit ironically, predicated on rigid agency
106. The case history of Terrence Stubbs is described in Stubbs v. Kline, 463 F. Supp. 110,
112-13 (W.D. Pa. 1978).
107. 22 PA. CODE § 341.91(c) mandates procedural safeguards against "disciplinary exclu-
sions" from approved private schools.
108. Plaintiffs' federal claims were filed pursuant to 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1416 (Cum. Supp.
1978) (EHCA) and 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Cum. Supp. 1978) (Rehabilitation Act). Pendant state
claims were covered by PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 13-1371 to 13-1377 (Purdon Supp. 1979-80).
109. 463 F. Supp. 110 (W.D. Pa. 1978).
110. Id at 117.
111. All institutions concerned denied responsibility for Terrence's education. The Home
for Crippled Children argued that under applicable rules its duty to provide for the boy did
not arise until the requirements of the Secretary of Education were fulfilled. The IU asserted
that once Terrence's mother agreed to placement in a private school its responsibility for place-
ment ceased. The Commonwealth urged that primary responsibility for providing Terrence
with a free, appropriate education originated and remained with the local district and IU. Id
Technically, the Home's position was correct. A Department of Education memorandum
dated December 13, 1976, and distributed to directors of approved private schools stated:
There can be no change in a student's assignment, including "public" assignment to a
private school, until the notice and hearing procedures of the State Board of Educa-
tion Regulations have been followed. In addition, because the Department of Educa-
tion has final approval over placement of students to private schools, there can be no
change in placement until the Department approval has been given.
perceptions of statutory duty. Unfortunately, exceptional children
such as Terrence Stubbs often fall between the boundaries of offi-
cially perceived duties.
Disputes over which district or agency shall assume responsibil-
ity for the education of an exceptional child are becoming more
common. Nationwide, these contests mirror the Pennsylvania expe-
rience and center on issues of residence, 1 2 educational disposi-
tion,"13 and finances."41 Unfortunately, these disputes are fostered
by the problems of allocating funds and services to meet the special-
ized needs of a group of persons as diverse as the handicapped." 5
The educational establishment has been slow to respond to the
needs of exceptional children. Furthermore, the response that has
come from educators has resulted from judicial intervention. 1 6 Be-
cause of this apparent inability of the educational establishment to
take the initiative, it seems likely that the handicapped placement
system will continue its lethargic pace." 7 "As a generation of
would-be educational reformers have learned to their sorrow, long
entrenched school practices are not lightly tampered with."
118
Memorandum from Pennsylvania Department of Education (Dec. 13, 1976), Record at 157a,
Fitz v. Intermediate Unit # 29, 43 Pa. Commw. Ct. 370, 403 A.2d 138 (1979).
The IU never chose to exercise any responsibility because it refused to find an interim
placement for Terrence and failed to formulate the required IEP. The IU violated its statutory
duty under PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 13-1372(2) (Purdon Supp. 1979-80).
Responsibility for Terrence's exclusion from any educational program for the 1977-78
academic year must necessarily fall upon the Commonwealth if the educational guarantees
originating in P,4RC are to be accorded validity. See notes 8-12 and accompanying text supra.
Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the Stubbs court stayed the action and remanded
the plaintiffs' claims to the Department of Health, Education and Welfare. 463 F. Supp. at
117.
112. See, e.g., William C. v. Board of Educ., 71 111. App. 3d 793, 390 N.E.2d 479 (1979); In
re G.H., 218 N.W.2d 441 (N.D. 1974); Doe v. Kingery, - W. Va. -, 203 S.E.2d 358 (1974).
113. See, e.g., North v. District of Columbia Bd. of Educ., 471 F. Supp. 136 (D.D.C.
1979); Boxall v. Sequoia Union High School Dist., 464 F. Supp. 1104 (N.D. Cal. 1979); Lom-
bardi v. Nyquist, 63 App. Div. 2d 1058, 406 N.Y.S.2d 148 (1978); In re Lofft, 86 Misc. 2d.431,
383 N.Y.S.2d 142 (1976).
114. See, e.g., State v. Stecher, 35 Conn. Supp. 501, 390 A.2d 408 (Super. Ct. 1977); In re
Leitner, 40 App. Div. 2d 38, 337 N.Y.S.2d 267 (1972).
115. "Designing a comprehensive program to provide education for persons as diverse as
the handicapped . . . is perhaps the most difficult educational problem facing society today."
Harrison v. Michigan, 350 F. Supp. 846, 848 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
116. Appropriate Education, supra note 9, at 668.
117. The Commonwealth solicited public comments concerning its 1980 annual program
plan prepared pursuant to the Education of All Handicapped Children Act. See note 94 and
accompanying text supra; PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, FISCAL YEAR 1980
ANNUAL PROGRAM PLAN UNDER PART B OF THE EDUCATION OF THE HANDICAPPED ACT AS
AMENDED BY PUBLIC LAW 94-142, at 184-92 (1979). Despite numerous allegations of inade-
quacies and deficiencies in the Commonwealth's methods of identification, placement, and
education of handicapped children, "the Pennsylvania Department of Education made no
modifications prior to adopting the final plan." Id at 215.
118. Kirp, supra note 82, at 794.
B. Misclassification. Scylla and Charybdis Revisited
Sharri Levy" 9 began attending an approved private school for
"brain injured" children in September 1969. In 1976 Sharri's par-
ents requested that the local school district find a new placement for
Sharri, who was approaching secondary school age. The district and
IU determined that Sharri was "brain injured" and recommended
the Vanguard School, an institution on the list of the Department of
Education as a suitable facility for brain damaged children.
Mrs. Levy approved the placement, and Sharri was enrolled at
Vanguard in September 1976. The school district then forwarded its
favorable recommendation and a completed application to the De-
partment of Education, which disapproved the application.' 20 Sub-
sequent to a due process hearing in January 1977, the Secretary
determined that Sharri was "mentally retarded" rather than "brain
injured." Thus, Vanguard was not considered a proper placement.
On appeal, the commonwealth court reversed the Secretary's deci-
sion and found that reliance by the Department of Education on IQ
tests as the sole criteria for its determination was a "blatant disregard
of competent evidence establishing that [Sharri was] not mentally
retarded, but . . . in fact, brain injured."''
The case illustrates the dangers of misclassification and incor-
rect labeling referred to in P1ARC. 122 In Pennsylvania, the right of
any exceptional child to a free education in a private school depends
totally on the child's handicap classification.' 23 In Sharri Levy's
case, disagreement on that classification placed the girl "between the
Scylla of mental retardation and the Charybdis of brain injury." '24
Initial classification by school district personnel can, however,
serve legitimate purposes. A vital need exists to isolate and define a
particular child's handicapping condition and mold a suitable educa-
119. The case history of Sharri Levy is reconstructed from the Record, Briefs, and Deci-
sion in Levy v. Commonwealth, Dep't of Educ., 41 Pa. Commw. Ct. 356, 399 A.2d 159 (1979).
120. A number of students were enrolled before 1977 in private schools prior to receiving
departmental approval. A memorandum sent to all school districts in December of 1976, how-
ever, noted this "confusion over the assignment procedures" and announced the Department's
intent to actively monitor future private school placements. Enrollments completed initially
without official approval were retroactively covered by tuition grants if approval was granted
before February 1, 1977. Parents who enrolled their children in private schools without initial
approval were required to sign an affidavit stating that the placement was made pursuant to
school district recommendations. Memorandum from Pennsylvania Department of Education
to School District Superintendents (Dec. 13, 1976), Record at 157a-160a, Fitz v. Intermediate
Unit # 29, 43 Pa. Commw. Ct. 370, 403 A.2d 138 (1979).
121. Levy v. Commonwealth, Dep't of Educ., 41 Pa. Commw. Ct. 356, 361, 399 A.2d 159,
162 (1979).
122. 343 F. Supp. 279, 295 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
123. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 13-1376 (Purdon Supp. 1979-80).
124. Levy v. Commonwealth, Dep't of Educ., 41 Pa. Commw. Ct. 356, 357, 399 A.2d 159,
160 (1979). The judge refers to the six-headed monster (Scylla) and whirlpool (Charybdis)
that imperiled Odysseus in Homer's Odyssey.
tional program around it.'25 The pervasiveness of classification, 126
however, means that mistakes are not uncommon. 27  The dangers
inherent in classification, or "tracking," have consequently received
studied attention from the courts. 2  Errors in labeling often lead to
a "self-fulfilling prophecy" because the misclassified child performs
to the depths of his official grouping.1
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Levy v. Commonwealth, Department of Education represents an
unusually blatant example of misclassification. Yet the case suggests
other, more common systemic deficiencies. In general, Levy illus-
trates the insensitivity of a statutory classification scheme that chan-
nels admissions to private schools via rigid, ostensibly objective
criteria. Although parents have a vital, if subjective, interest in the
school to which their handicapped child may be assigned, they lack a
genuine voice in the placement decision. 30 Local school districts are
125. See Schwartz, supra note 9, at 129. Even the most carefully conceived and executed
classification schemes may serve a deleterious purpose. Labels, however validly placed, tend
to "legitimize educational planning" by "assuming homogeneity of educational needs within
traditional categories .... " Thus educational programs predicated on categories or groups
may tend to ossify and become ineffective. See Connors & Connors, supra note 40, at 74.
126. "From primary school until graduation, most schools group (or track) students on the
basis of estimated intellectual ability, both within classrooms . . . and in separate classes."
Kirp, supra note 82, at 710.
127. See, e.g., In re Mecca, 369 N.Y.S.2d 282 (1975), in which "slip-shod and unsatisfac-
tory" screening procedures resulted in the classification as handicapped of a boy with a behav-
ior problem. After the boy's mother registered him at a private facility and sought tuition
reimbursement, the reviewing court found the misclassification and denied reimbursement.
The drafters of EHCA were deeply concerned over the practices and problems of student
classification. See S. REP. No. 94-168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 26, reprintedin [1975] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1425, 1450. See notes 28-42 and accompanying text supra.
128. See, e.g., Larry P. v. Riles, 343 F. Supp. 1306 (N.D. Cal. 1972), af'd, 502 F.2d 963
(9th Cir. 1974) (school district enjoined from placing black students in classes for the educable
mentally retarded when primary criterion for the classification was I.Q. test results); Hobson v.
Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), affdsub nom., Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C.
Cir. 1969). Hobson was the first case in which standardized tests were successfully attacked.
The court assailed the use of I.Q. tests as the cause of an unjust "tracking system" and ability
grouping that denied plaintiff-students equal educational opportunity.
In Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971), the Supreme Court considered the
necessity of a due process hearing before a state stigmatizes a citizen through a classification
scheme. The PARC court cited Constantineau for the proposition that due process safeguards
must be available before a school stigmatizes a child by classifying him as handicapped. Penn-
sylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279, 295 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
See also Moses v. Washington Parish School Bd., 330 F. Supp. 1340 (E.D. La. 1971), aft'd, 456
F.2d 1285 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1013 (1972). See generally Sorgen, Labeling
and Classfcation, in THE MENTALLY RETARDED CITIZEN AND THE LAW 214 (M. Kindred, J.
Cohen, D. Penrod, T. Shaffer ed. 1976).
129. See Connors & Connors, supra note 40, at 73-74.
130. See, e.g., the testimony of Edward Savka, father of a hearing impaired son, in Record
at 232a-252a, Savka v. Commonwealth, Dep't of Educ., 44 Pa. Conmw. Ct. 62, 403 A.2d 142
(1979). See also the testimony of the parent in Record at 198a-200a, Levy v. Commonwealth,
Dep't of Educ., 41 Pa. Commw. Ct. 356, 399 A.2d 159 (1979).
The response of the Department of Education to these parental concerns is that excep-
tional children are not entitled to the best educational program. Rather, "an exceptional child
in the Commonwealth is entitled to an appropriate program of special education at public
expense." Brief for Respondent [Department of Education] at 12, Savka v. Commonwealth,
Dep't of Educ., 44 Pa. Commw. Ct. 62, 403 A.2d 142 (1979). See also the closing statement of
counsel for the Department in Record at 268a-273a, Levy v. Commonwealth, Dep't of Educ.,
41 Pa. Commw. Ct. 356, 399 A.2d 159 (1979).
also prohibited fiom selecting "criteria which is not recognized in
state regulations and standards as proper grounds for utilizing the
approved private schools."' 3 ' Thus, the present Pennsylvania statu-
tory classification scheme fails to provide for a sensitive, flexible re-
sponse to the interests of parents and local districts.'
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C. Family v. State: The Due Process Battleground
Paul Pecunas, Jr.'3 3 is a child with tension athetoid cerebral
palsy, an illness that requires confinement to a wheelchair and com-
munication through an electronic language board. In January of
1978, when Paul was nine, his parents requested his placement in a
regular classroom with supportive services for the following school
year. The local school district and IU, however, recommended
placement in a class for the physically handicapped. At a due proc-
ess hearing the parents presented expert testimony on Paul's normal
intelligence, academic functioning, and socialization. The hearing
officer concluded, nevertheless, that the parents' evidence lacked
"the expertise and precision of the District/IU position." Specifi-
cally, the evaluation of Paul by a private psychologist was given no
weight because the expert was not a certified school psychologist. 1
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The Pecunas' dilemma illustrates the practical problems faced
by exceptional children and their parents in utilizing due process
procedures. Although parents have valuable statutory rights regard-
ing a child's placement, they lack the ability to protect the child's
legal interest fully, 135 a problem that manifests itself at all three
agency stages of the due process scheme.'3 6
1. Prehearing Stage. -Initially, parents may not even realize
that due process procedures are available. 31  The parents' lack of
knowledge may be subtly perpetuated by overreaching school offi-
131. Brief for Appellee at 23, Levy v. Commonwealth, Dep't of Educ., 41 Pa. Commw. Ct.
356, 399 A.2d 159 (1979).
132. New York, in contrast, allows for a degree of autonomy at the local level in the
implementation of the state's law for the education of the handicapped. Each board of educa-
tion must establish a "committee on the handicapped" minimally composed of a school psy-
chologist, a teacher of special education, a school physician, and a parent of a handicapped
child. The committees have responsibility for identifying and recommending placements for
handicapped children. See N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 4402 (McKinney Supp. 1979). See generally
Comment, supra note 58.
133. The case history of Paul Pecunas is reconstructed through factual allegations and
exhibits contained in Complaint, Pecunas v. Kline, No. 78-3133 (E.D. Pa., filed Sept. 19, 1978).
134. Id at Exhibit A, 11.
135. Miller & Miller, supra note 40, at 27.
136. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(6) (1978) requires that the special education of handicapped chil-
dren administered by any state or local agency be governed by the same due process safe-
guards required of the state's chief educational agency. Nevertheless, the Department of
Education has decided that no due process hearing is necessary for detention center placement
of a child found delinquent or socially deprived pursuant to the Juvenile Act. See Memoran-
dum from Pennsylvania Department of Education, Legal Office (February 4, 1977).
137. See, e.g., Complaint at 11, Brown v. Kline, No. 78-2814 (E.D. Pa., filed Aug. 23,
cials. 13 8 Moreover, even when parents know their procedural rights,
they may be subject to school district or agency pressures designed to
inhibit the exercise of those rights.'39
The problem is especially acute when the parents are poor or
lack education. Parents may be unaccustomed to, or fearful of, deal-
ing with an educational establishment that employs incomprehensi-
ble standards and procedures. In addition, it may often be
financially impossible for a parent to contest the child's educational
placement. 140
2. Hearing Stage. -At a due process hearing the initial burden
of going forward with the evidence is on the school district, but the
burden can be discharged by introducing into evidence the official
report recommending a change in educational placement. The bur-
den then shifts to the parents to introduce evidence and testimony to
rebut the official recommendation. This obviously places a much
greater burden on the parents.141
1978) in which plaintiffs allege that at no time during the period of her son's exclusion from
school was Mrs. Brown apprised of her due process ights.
Although "a parent's involvement in a due process hearing provides an opportunity for
familiarization with federal and state laws, regulations and standards," parents "may not al-
ways be informed" that they have certain rights or that certain requests should be presented in
writing. "Parent training sessions" designed to inform parents of procedural safeguards repre-
sent one suggested solution to the knowledge problem. PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF EDU-
CATION, FISCAL YEAR 1980 ANNUAL PROGRAM PLAN UNDER PART B OF THE EDUCATION OF
THE HANDICAPPED ACT As AMENDED BY PUBLIC LAW 94-142, at 187 (1979).
138. One parent testified that at the first program placement conference with IU officials
on the future of his son's education, "law" and "appropriate" were words that were used fre-
quently. Record at 236a, Savka v. Commonwealth, Dep't of Educ., 44 Pa. Commw. Ct. 62, 403
A.2d 142 (1979). The obvious implication is that the initial due process stage may be used to
blunt parental meddling, while ignoring its statutorily mandated function to give the parent
detailed information about the proposed educational change or modification. See 22 PA.
CODE § 13.31(f)(1).
139. In Armstrong v. Kline, 476 F. Supp. 583 (E.D. Pa. 1979), counsel for an exceptional
child was "advised" by counsel for the Department of Education that any attempt to convene a
due process hearing regarding the child's needs "would be futile." Complaint at 9, id.
140. See Lora v. Board of Educ., 456 F. Supp. 1211, 1294 (E.D.N.Y. 1978). See also
Connors & Connors, supra note 40, at 71; Note, supra note 12, at 1110-11.
141. 22 PA. CODE § 13.32(15). In Fitz v. Intermediate Unit # 29, 43 Pa. Commw. Ct. 370,
403 A.2d 138 (1979), the IU satisfied its burden by submitting a general outline of a possible
future program in support of its recommended placement. The hearing officer opined that the
presentation of the IU did not indicate the existence of a well planned program. Record at
46a, id Nevertheless, despite their presentation of expert witness testimony, the parents did not
prevail because they "failed to establish that the District or IU could not provide an appropri-
ate vocational program f given the opportunity. "43 Pa. Commw. Ct. at 375, 403 A.2d at 141
(emphasis added).
In contrast, New York grants some original jurisdiction over mentally and physically
handicapped children to its family courts. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §§ 231, 232 (McKinney
Supp. 1979). Thus, parents may sometimes avoid administrative agency procedure by appeal-
ing directly to the court for relief. In In re Peter H., 66 Misc. 2d 1097, 323 N.Y.S.2d 302
(1971), the family court refused to follow school district recommendations when it appeared
that for three previous years the school had not provided a suitable program for the handi-
capped student. The court declined to allow the child's "entire future to be further jeopardized
by gambling on a special educational system that [had] yet to prove itself." Id at 1099, 323
N.Y.S.2d at 305. The court's decision stands in stark contrast to the administrative obfuscation
in Fitz.
Parents have the right to present evidence at the hearing and
may introduce testimony of expert medical, psychological, or educa-
tional witnesses.42 In practice, however, parents are virtually pow-
erless at this due process stage since they are usually not educational
or medical professionals, and the subjective evidence 43 they can
present at a hearing is of limited evidentiary value.144 Even when
the family can afford expert testimony, the system often deprives
outside or private expert testimony of probative value. 1
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At the hearing stage, parents face an additional problem in the
person of the hearing officer. Hearing officer assignments are made
by the Department of Education, and the only qualification for as-
signment is that the individual must not be an "officer, employe, or
agent of any school district or IU in which the person resides."'
146
The practical effect of this solitary restriction is that hearing officers
are selected from personnel employed by neighboring school dis-
tricts and IUs. 147  Thus, the impartiality of the hearing officer is a
significant issue. 148 In at least one case a parent argued that he was
142. 22 PA. CODE § 13.32(20).
143. See note 130 and accompanying text supra.
144. In one hearing, for example, the parents pf an exceptional child offered evidence that
their son had not been "progressing too well" in a program provided by the local school dis-
trict. The Secretary of Education subsequently characterized the statement as "non-specific
and insubstantial" and thus insufficient evidence of program inadequacy. Record at lOa-lI la,
Fitz v. Intermediate Unit # 29, 43 Pa. Commw. Ct. 370, 403 A.2d 138 (1979).
Also illustrative of the limited evidentiary value of parental testimony is the following
excerpt from a description of the effect of the disputed placement of an exceptional child in
Vanguard, an approved private school, by the child's mother:
Well, Sharri has achieved for the first time in her life successes-successes in friend-
ships, successes academically. . . . [Slhe's happy to go to school. She's happy when
she comes home. . . . She loves her surroundings. She's comfortable. . . .And
she's just happy about all these new friendships. . . .She's in a very normal situation
and its very-its good for her because she loves Vanguard and it shows in everything
she does. She's a happy member of our family.
Record at 199a-200a, Levy v. Commonwealth, Dep't of Educ., 41 Pa. Commw. Ct. 356, 399
A.2d 159 (1979). The subsequent opinion and order issued by the Secretary of Education
made no mention of the mother's testimony in disapproving of Sharri's placement at Van-
guard. See Record at 4a-8a, id
145. See, e.g., note 133 and accompanying text supra Although parents may elect to pro-
cure outside evaluations by an approved private school, as the Pecunas did, these evaluations
"may be supplemented by the school district.., to the extent the district. . . deems necessary
. .. See 22 PA. CODE § 171.15(c). Thus, when the district conducted its "supplementary"
evaluations, the Pecunas family found that the evaluation of its expert was "of little public
school concern" because it was performed by a private psychologist. See Complaint at (Ex-
hibit A) 11, Pecunas v. Kline, No. 78-3133 (E.D. Pa., filed Sept. 19, 1978).
146. 22 PA. CODE § 13.32(12).
147. See, e.g., Savka v. Commonwealth, Dep't of Educ., 44 Pa. Commw. Ct. 62, 403 A.2d
142 (1979) (hearing officer was employee of neighboring IU); Fitz v. Intermediate Unit # 29,
43 Pa. Commw. Ct. 370, 403 A.2d 138 (1979) (hearing officer was an "instructional advisor" to
a hearing impaired program of a neighboring IU); West Chester Area School Dist. v. Com-
monwealth, Secretary of Educ., 43 Pa. Commw. Ct. 14, 401 A.2d 610 (1979) (hearing officer
was assistant director of special education for the Philadelphia School District).
148. Commentators concerned with 45 C.F.R. § 121a.507(1978), dealing with impartial
hearing officer provisions, sought to have three-person panels, including parents, serve as hear-
ing examiners, but federal regulations remain unchanged. See 45 C.F.R. § 121a, App. A
(1978). See also Alschuler, supra note 9, at 532.
denied an impartial hearing because the hearing officer, an employee
of an IU, was "an ally of the opposition."' 49 The commonwealth
court held, however, that the parent had waived the issue of the im-
partiality of the hearing officer by failing to raise it at the hearing.' 50
3. Post-Hearing Stage. -The Secretary of Education issues the
final order in any educational placement adjudication, an order re-
sponsive to the proposed report submitted by the hearing officer. t'5
Thus, the inherent defects of the hearing stage usually become ap-
parent only after the hearing when the officer submits his report for
final disposition.
Two factors militate against impartiality in the post-hearing,
due process stage. First, the Department has wide discretion to ap-
prove or disapprove assignments to private schools, and an applica-
tion for assignment may be disapproved even if the district and the
parents both agree on its propriety.' 52 Second, the Department is,
essentially, the ultimate factfinder.153 It reviews the case de novo on
the basis of the record. Given these factors, it would be naive not to
suggest that the Department may favor the testimony of witnesses
familiar to it over that of unknown witnesses.
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4. The Agency Stages of Due Process.- Conclusion.-The cases
mandate the inescapable conclusion that the practical problems
faced by exceptional children and their parents who seek to employ
due process protections render the statutory safeguards meaningless.
Fortunately, the cases also indicate that some parents have the
149. "At the hearing the parents are faced with a grave disappointment when they learn
that this impartial hearing is being conducted by an ally of the opposition." Brief for Peti-
tioner at 17, Savka v. Commonwealth, Dep't of Educ., 44 Pa. Commw. Ct. 62, 403 A.2d 142
(1979).
150. Savka v. Commonwealth, Dep't of Educ., 44 Pa. Commw. Ct. 62, 68, 403 A.2d 142,
145 (1979).
151. 1 PA. CODE §§ 35.187, 35.226; 22 PA. CODE § 1.6.
152. 22 PA. CODE § 171.16(g)(2).
153. See Fitz v. Intermediate Unit # 29, 43 Pa. Commw. Ct. 370, 375-76, 403 A.2d 138,
141 (1979) (by implication).
154. Levy v. Commonwealth, Dep't of Educ., 41 Pa. Commw. Ct. 356, 399 A.2d 159
(1979), illustrates the dangers attendant to the discretionary powers of the Department as
factfinder in the post-hearing stage. In Levy, the Secretary determined that the record dis-
closed no substantial evidence to warrant placement of the child in an approved private school
for the "brain injured." Record at 8a (Opinion and Order of Secretary), id The sole evidence
of the Department at the hearing, however, consisted of the testimony of two witnesses, one of
whom was a Department administrator with no experience or training in the area of learning
disabilities. Id at 243a (hearing transcript). Neither witness for the Department had ever
tested, examined, or evaluated the child in question, but both had initially disapproved the
private school placement. Id at 249a. Yet, despite the testimony of a battery of expert wit-
nesses presented by appellant - parents, witnesses who had clinical contact with the child and
who recommended private placement, the Secretary disapproved the placement. The facts
clearly support the charge that "the Secretary, without any stated justification, [gave] no sub-
stantial weight to the testimony of anyone but her own employees .... " Brief for Appellant
at 21, id The commonwealth court subsequently agreed with this charge and reversed the
Secretary's order. 41 Pa. Commw. Ct. at 361, 399 A.2d at 162.
financial and emotional resources to carry their problems to the
courts. Resort to judicial remedies, however, is not desirable be-
cause the burdens of delay and lost educational opportunity are ulti-
mately borne by the child.
D. Fiscal Failures
In Armstrong v. Kline, 55 plaintiffs successfully challenged the
provision of the statute that required the Commonwealth to fund
special education programs for only 180 days per year. The court's
"ultimate factual finding" was that the 180-day rule precluded plain-
tiffs "from receiving an education that is likely to allow them to
reach their reasonably set educational goals with respect to self-suffi-
ciency .... 156
The Armstrong decision is of considerable benefit to those ex-
ceptional children whose needs require a year-round program of ed-
ucation and training. This decision fails, however, to cure other
financial problems inherent in the placement procedure. Tuition
ceilings remain in effect and impact most severely on those whose
financial need is greatest. 57 The propensity of school districts to dis-
claim responsibility for the education of a particular child is, in fact,
often based on these financial considerations. 5 8  Educating the
handicapped is expensive; on the average a state must spend twice as
much to provide an education for a handicapped child as it does for
a nonhandicapped student. 5 9 Moreover, EHCA provides only
about one-fourth of the added expense to eligible states.
160
Several consequences flow from the cost factors involved in ed-
ucating exceptional children. At best, school district and IU officials
tend to develop IEPs based on existing resources available within the
district rather than on the needs of the child. 16 1 A tendency to en-
155. 476 F. Supp. 583 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
156. Id at 600.
157. Halderman v. Pittenger, 391 F. Supp. 872, 875 (E.D. Pa. 1975). See note 69 supra.
See also Scavella v. School Bd., 363 So. 2d 1095 (Fla. 1978) (statutory "cap" on tuition paya-
ble by district is constitutional, but cannot be invoked to deny handicapped child a "reason-
able opportunity" to receive free education); Elliot v. Board of Educ., 64 Ill. App. 3d 229, 380
N.E.2d 1137 (1978) (statutory ceilings on tuition payments violated education article of state
constitution).
New York has no tuition ceilings, but a parent with adequate financial resources may be
required to contribute to the private school maintenance costs of his handicapped child. See,
e.g., Levy v. City of New York, 38 N.Y.2d 653, 345 N.E.2d 556, 382 N.Y.S.2d 13 (1976); In re
Butcher, 82 Misc. 2d 666, 372 N.Y.S.2d 514 (1975); In re Davis, 82 Misc. 2d 659, 370 N.Y.S.2d
351 (1975); In re Stein, 81 Misc. 2d 91, 365 N.Y.S.2d 450 (1975). But see In re Downey, 72
Misc. 2d 772, 340 N.Y.S.2d 687 (1973).
158. See generally Part IV(B) supra.
159. Miller & Miller, supra note 40, at 17. See generally Benjamin & Blair, supra note 83.
160. Miller & Miller, supra note 40, at 17.
161. In one case the Department of Education determined that a school district's recom-
mendation that a child be placed in a private school was based on the financial inability of the
district to provide a suitable program. Opinion of the Secretary of Education in Brief for
Appellant at 32, West Chester Area School Dist. v. Commonwealth, Secretary of Educ., 43 Pa.
courage parents to accept the suggested IEPs results. 162 Less justifia-
ble is the failure of school officials to actively seek out, evaluate, and
prepare appropriate, although costly, programs for exceptional chil-
dren. 1
63
The state, of course, has a "significant interest" in restricting the
use of costly programs and facilities to those who demonstrate real
need.'1 Courts directly confronted with the issue, however, have
maintained that cost is not a defense to the denial of education rights
to exceptional children, and when adequate funds are not available
to finance all required programs, existing monies must be expended
equitably. 65 In the final analysis the allocation of finite resources is
a matter for the legislature. Tuition ceilings and cost-effective IEPs
are perhaps inevitable consequences of the fiscal limitations of state
budgets. 166
E. Right to Treatment
Pennsylvania recognizes that exceptional children "have greater
need for formal education since they are less likely than ordinary
children to learn and to develop informally."'' 67  Yet Pennsylvania
effectively denies treatment of the very mental or physical debilita-
tion that gives rise to the exceptional child's "greater need."'' 6' The
Commw. Ct. 14,401 A.2d 610 (1979). In another case a district maintained that "existing aides
and resources could not be used appropriately if the parents' requests for a full-time aide and
therapy [were] written into the IEP." Complaint at (Exhibit A) 7, Pecunas v. Kline, No. 78-
3133 (E.D. Pa., filed Sept. 19, 1978). See also Note, supra note 12, at 1109-10.
162. Miller & Miller, supra note 40, at 5-6.
163. See generally Part IV(A) supra.
164. Cf. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (the Supreme Court considered a state's
interest in the use of its mental health facilities).
165. See, e.g., Lora v. Board of Educ., 456 F. Supp. 1211, 1293 (E.D.N.Y. 1978); Mills v.
Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 876 (D.D.C. 1972).
166. "It would be unthinkable . . . to suggest that confronted with economic strictures
State government is powerless to move forward in the fields of education and social welfare
with anything less than totally comprehensive programs." In re Levy v. City of New York, 38
N.Y.2d 653, 660, 345 N.E.2d 556, 560, 382 N.Y.S.2d 13, 17 (1976).
167. Fialkowski v. Shapp, 405 F. Supp. 946, 959 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
168. When an exceptional child is placed in an approved private school the only allowable
costs are those for tuition and maintenance. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 13-1376(a) (Purdon
Supp. 1979-80).
Arguably, the School Code, rather than denying treatment, merely does not provide for it,
and treatment can be obtained elsewhere. Several considerations, however, militate against
acceptance of this argument. The expense of private psychiatric and medical treatment may
preclude the poor from obtaining needed care. Although other state and local service agencies
provide treatment and therapeutic services, these may often be inadequate. Specialized serv-
ices may not be available, and the agency may not provide for the needed coordination and
continuity between its service and the child's educational program. Social service agencies
may condition treatment on the active role of a reluctant parent. The difficulties may be exac-
erbated when the child is placed in a private facility hundreds of miles from home. Reason
dictates that the only viable treatment available is through the private facility.
In West Chester Area School Dist. v. Commonwealth, Secretary of Educ., 43 Pa. Commw.
Ct. 14, 401 A.2d 610 (1979), the Secretary approved the educational placement of a socially
and emotionally disturbed boy in a day program on the condition that the parents secure and
"medical problems" of handicapped children "do not qualify for
treatment in an educational setting ..... 169 The Department of
Education "eschews any attempt at treatment of mental, physical, or
emotional disorders in public school children as a welfare problem
.... 9,170 The crucial issue thus becomes whether educational pro-
grams can be effective in the absence of concurrent treatment.
Fortunately, two trends point to the possible development of a
right to treatment for exceptional children. First, the right to treat-
ment has been established in a variety of situations in which individ-
uals have been placed in residential institutions. 17' Second, the
Supreme Court has determined that students who are incapable of
benefitting from the education made available to them "are effec-
tively foreclosed from any meaningful education." 72 When right to
treatment cases are read in conjunction with the education cases, a
right to treatment for exceptional children clearly emerges.
The few courts that have squarely confronted the issue have
provided limited substance for the right to treatment in a purely edu-
cational context. Two courts have unequivocally rejected the
idea. 173 In Lora v. Board of Education of the City of New York, 1
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however, the court invoked the right to treatment when children with
emotional problems were removed from the public schools and reas-
signed to "special day schools." Despite its particular facts, Lora
175
certainly "invites broader applications of the right to treatment."'
176
School children with mental and physical handicaps present dual
actively support necessary psychiatric therapy. Although the Secretary's aims were laudatory,
the record in the case indicated that the parents were unlikely to fulfill their responsibility. See
Brief for Appellants at 13-14, id
169. Complaint at (Exhibit A) 10, Pecunas v. Kline, No. 78-3133 (E.D. Pa., filed Sept. 19,
1978).
170. Brief for Respondent [School District] at 2, O'Grady v. Centennial School Dist., 43
Pa. Commw. Ct. 287, 401 A.2d 1388 (1979).
171. See, e.g., Lora v. Board of Educ., 456 F. Supp. 1211 (E.D. N.Y. 1978) (students with
emotional problems in special day schools); Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575 (S.D.N.Y.
1972) (training school for boys); Inmates of Boys Training School v. Affieck, 346 F. Supp. 1354
(D.R.1. 1972) (training school for boys); Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 334 F. Supp.
1341 (M.D. Ala. 1971), and 344 F. Supp. 373, 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), af'd sub nom., Wyatt v.
Aderbelt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974) (mentally retarded committed to state school). See
also Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295, 1314-20 (E.D. Pa.
1977) (retarded residents of state institution have right to "habilitation"). But see New York
State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752, 759 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
172. Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 566 (1974). The case addressed the failure of the San
Francisco school system to provide English language instruction to non-English speaking Chi-
nese students.
173. Sherer v. Waier, 457 F. Supp. 1039 (W.D. Mo. 1978); Guempel v. State, 159 N.J.
Super. 166, 387 A.2d 399 (1978).
174. 456 F. Supp. 1211 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
175. The students' emotional problems resulted in "severe acting-out and aggression in
school." The court appeared to regard the reassignment of these students as something akin to
a disciplinary proceeding entailing an involuntary loss of liberty.
176. See Case Comment, The Right to Treatment and Educational Rights of Handicapped
Persons: Lora v. Board ofEducation, 31 STAN. L. REv. 807, 811 (1979).
needs for special education and treatment. Neither need can be ef-
fectively satisfied at the expense of the other.
V. Conclusions and Recommendations
The PARC mandate that all handicapped children in Penn-
sylvania receive an appropriate free education has been substantially
weakened since 1972. The erosion of this mandate is evidenced by
administrative indolence in affirmatively implementing statutory
and judicial directives, insensitive application of inflexible regula-
tions dealing with handicap classifications and due process proce-
dures, the Commonwealth's questionable ability and desire to
shoulder the financial burdens of educating the handicapped, and
the lack of a total education policy containing provisions for treat-
ment.
Successes have certainly occurred because a greater number of
exceptional children are presently receiving educational services
than a decade ago. But any assumption that the task is complete is
foolhardy.
Numerous remedies are possible. First, the concept of main-
streaming must be re-evaluated by educators and legislators. De-
spite its laudable original purpose, the device has sometimes forced
exceptional children into the mainstream because a more appropri-
ate program is either too expensive or not readily available. Second,
the statutory classification of exceptional children that forms the ba-
sis for the distribution of educational programs must be relaxed to
allow for a flexible response to parental and local district concerns.
Third, the legislature must thoroughly revise due process procedures
to provide for a greater parental voice. The entire hearing procedure
should be modified for genuine impartiality, and specifically, the De-
partment of Education must be relieved of its responsibility for ad-
ministering due process safeguards. One alternative may be the
creation of an independent body, minimally appended to the De-
partment, with sole responsibility for conducting hearings.' 77
Fourth, the Commonwealth's financial responsibility for both the
education and treatment of exceptional children must be clarified
and, if possible, expanded. Tuition ceilings should be abolished, or
at least implemented on a sliding scale basis to aid poorer families.
The most important remedy, however, is immune from legisla-
tion. The "system" must realize that an education for the excep-
tional child is a matter of right, and not a display of governmental
largesse. Moreover, "educators must cease being preoccupied with
having a smoothly functioning system, and instead, must refocus
177. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 15, § IN (West).
their attention on the individual student."' 78 Accordingly, the role
of the legal profession in the handicapped child's right to an educa-
tion is the enforcement of bureaucratic respect for the handicapped
child and his rights.
GARY D. FRY
178. Appropriate Education, supra note 9, at 682.

